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Introduction
The status of theory in demography is higher now than when Rupert Vance asked, in his
1952 presidential address to the Population Association of America, ‘Is Theory for
Demographers?’ [Vance, 1952]. Vance’s answer was a resounding ‘yes.’2 But in the years
following, mainstream demography remained ambivalent about ‘theory,’ finding comfort in the
more familiar realms of quantitative data and technique [see Burch, 1996, pp.60-61.] In 1984,
Livi-Bacci could warn that demography ran the risk of becoming ‘more a technique than a
science’ [1984, p.iii]. The systematic intellectual history of this aspect of the discipline remains
to be written, but examples of ambivalence and neglect are not hard to find. As late as 1991, for
instance, plans for a special issue of Demography on ‘explanatory theories of fertility decline’
had to be abandoned due to a lack of sufficient contributions.3

1

. This is the latest revision of a paper presented at the Chaire Quetelet 1997, Louvain-laNeuve, Belgium, 26-28 November 1997. It differs in a few small respects from the version
submitted for publication. The work on which it is based has been supported by the Canadian
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, grant #410-96-1303.
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. Vance did not offer a formal definition of ‘theory,’ but rather seemed to assume his
readers would understand what he meant. He mentions ‘general theory,’ but suggests that much
demographic theory will be theory of the ‘middle range’ [following Robert Merton]. Transition
theory is cited as a prime example of a major theoretical perspective, but one needing further
work.
3

. Mason [1997] writes that following Vance’s 1952 address, ‘...demographers have
indulged in social science theorizing with a vengeance’ [p.443]. It depends partly on what one
means by ‘theorizing,’ but I would tend to agree with her statement only with respect to the last
decade or so, with the exception of economists [principally Becker, Leibenstein, and Easterlin],
who began sustained systematic work on fertility theory as early as 1960, and who, in the case of
Becker and Leibenstein at least, considered themselves theorists. Davis’s PAA address [Davis,
1963], Coale’s reconsideration of transition theory [Coale, 1973], Freedman’s ‘reappraisal’ of
fertility theories [1979], and Caldwell’s restatement of transition theory [1976] all are landmark
2

This period of demographic history now seems behind us. The introduction of
microeconomic theory into demography around 1960 was a turning point. After some delay,
the last decade has seen a surge of interest in theory by non-economist demographers. In a
different sub-field, the establishment of an IUSSP research committee on migration theory
[Massey et al., 1993] is symptomatic. But nowhere has the growing interest in theory been
greater than in the area of fertility decline. The links of the topic to areas of practical concern
such as family planning and population control, the enormous expansion of empirical evidence
on fertility declines past and present, and the scientific stimulus provided by early theoretical
statements in the form of ‘transition theory’ [whose oversimplification became apparent in light
of an expanded evidential base] -- these and other factors have led to a steady stream of
theoretical papers seeking some kind of general statement about key factors in fertility decline.
Most recently, Caldwell, in his presidential address to the IUSSP [1997], assigns to the global
fertility transition ‘...a dominance in demography possessed by no other theme...,’ and calls for a
unified theory of fertility decline that would avoid treating earlier transitions and more recent
ones [assisted by large-scale family planning programs] as qualitatively different [p.803].
In approaching my assigned task of providing an ‘overview of the main fertility theories,’
I have focussed on papers published in the last decade, roughly 1987 or later. But even for this
short period, it would be impossible in one paper to summarize, much less critically assess, all
the important contributions. Rather, I have tried to identify several substantive themes and
methodological tendencies that appear to stand out in recent work. If I neglect important work
or themes, I am consoled by the fact that they probably have received their due in one or more
of the several excellent review articles published recently [Hirschman, 1994; Van Da Kaa, 1996;
Kirk, 1996; Robinson, 1997; Mason, 1997. See also the contribution by Piché and Poirier in this
volume].
Overall, there has been much progress, but we still stand short of the comprehensive
general theory of fertility decline -- much less verified theory -- that many feel is needed for both
the scientific maturity of demography [Hirschman, 1994; Van De Kaa, 1996; Mason, 1997,
Caldwell, 1997] and the cogency of its policy analyses [Robinson, 1997]. Whether such general
theory is possible, however, and if so what form it might take, remain matters of explicit -- but
more often implicit -- methodological dispute.

I state the main substantive themes and methodological tendencies in point form, with a
few illustrations4 and a brief discussion of each. I return to what seem to me the most important

papers. But I believe it is true that none of these demographers, in contrast to the microeconomists, devoted large segments of their careers primarily to systematic theoretical work, or
considered demographic theory their main scientific concern.
4

. References in these discussions to particular authors or their works do not aim to give a
comprehensive view of their work. This underlines the fact that this is not a review article in the
3

issues in a concluding section, and suggest where the quest for a unified theory of fertility
decline may be leading us.
Substantive Themes
1. Most authors would improve on existing theories of fertility decline by adding
content, including factors previously excluded or neglected. The result is a trend toward
larger, more complex theoretical statements, with more variables and more complex
interrelations among variables. This trend is partly related to the felt need to deal with ‘culture’
and with ‘ideational’ factors, partly to the ever-growing body of detailed evidence on past and
contemporary fertility declines, leading to greater appreciation of historical context. There is
growing resistence to simple, single-factor explanations, fuelled in part by the influential attack
on the dominance of demand theories by Cleland and Wilson [1987] -- somewhat ironically,
since they eventually find ideational change to be ‘the fundamental cause’ of fertility decline
[emphasis added].
Mason [1997] identifies ‘six major theories of fertility decline,’ all of which she terms
‘incomplete’ [pp.444-445]. She argues for greater attention to culture and ideation [which she
considers conceptually distinct], including greater emphasis on subjective perceptions of the
key variables in the Easterlin synthesis [p.450; see also Szreter, 1996].5 Since objective values
of these variables are still relevant -- subjective perceptions are at least partly determined by
objective realities -- the net effect is greatly to increase the number of variables in a theoretical
scheme, each objective factor having its subjective counterpart. Mason also would re-introduce
an explicit focus on mortality, an element in early transition theory that has occupied a less
central place in more recent work, due in part to the empirical finding of the European Fertility
Project that mortality decline did not always precede fertility decline [Mason cites Chesnais,
1992 to question both this empirical generalization and its interpretation].6
Robinson [1997] would provide a much more detailed treatment of costs of fertility
control, differentiating among various methods, and recognizing three separate kinds of costs -time and money, social disapproval, and psychological discomfort.
Bongaarts and Watkins [1996] expand on the concept of diffusion [they prefer the term
social interaction], putting greater emphasis on external or ‘point-source’ diffusion in addition

usual sense of that term.
5

. Easterlin and Crimmins regularly conceptualized their variables in terms of relevant
perceptions, but often as not in empirical work used empirical indicators of objective conditions
due to a lack of data on perceptions as such.
6

. For an excellent review of the role of mortality, see Van De Kaa, 1996. On the
neglected issue of perceptions of mortality change by couples, see Montgomery, 1996.
4

to the internal or ‘interaction’ diffusion highlighted earlier by Rosero-Bixby and Casterline
[1993]. Montgomery and Casterline [1996] also broaden earlier treatments of diffusion,
expanding the concept to include not just ‘learning,’ but also ‘influence’ or social control. If
one thinks in terms of the number of variables included in a theory or associated model, all of
these authors have greatly increased the content of theory.
Most authors do not simply add more variables. They also introduce more complex
interrelationships between and among variables. Mason [1997] speaks of ‘interaction,’ in the
statistical sense of the term, and of delays, leads and lags. Her emphasis on interaction hearkens
back to Coale’s [1973] three preconditions for marital fertility decline, in effect a multiplicative
model [see Lesthaeghe, 1997b].
Robinson and Cleland [1992] complicate standard microeconomic theories with the
suggestion that costs of fertility control [not just the costs of children] affect the demand for
children, in contrast to the Easterlin model, for example, in which demand for children is
independent of costs of control. Lesthaeghe and Surkyn [1988] bridge the gap between
‘economic’ and ‘cultural’ factors by arguing that culture is partly endogenous to economic
changes, and economic changes partly endogenous to culture. That is, there is mutual causation
and feedback between the two realms.
The Chicago microeconomic school has not been immune to the trend towards bigger,
richer theories. Characteristically lean and spare, based on the tripartite assumption of utility
maximization, fixed preferences, and equilibrium, the Beckerian theory has been opened up to
incorporate an expanded notion of utility involving altruism and ‘dynastic’ considerations
[Becker and Barro, 1988; see also Seiver and Lage, 1996].
Finally, several authors have called for a return to an approach similar to Davis’s [1963]
‘multiphasic’ theory of fertility decline, in which marital fertility is seen as just one part of a
larger demographic system including, notably, marital patterns and out-migration. Hirschman
[1994] cites the work of Davis, of Lee [1987], and of Friedlander [1969; 1983]], while urging
return to an ‘equilibrium’ or ‘homeostatic’ framework for the study of fertility. He questions the
nearly exclusive focus on marital fertility, and comments: ‘If the homeostatic principle is to
maintain demographic equilibrium in order to avoid community and household strain, then
changes in fertility are only one of several mechanisms that can respond to ...rapid increases in
population growth...’[p.227]. Mason [1997] also urges a re-examination of the Davis theory.
Anderson and Morse [1993] sketch and make use of such a framework in their detailed study of
Scotland’s demographic transition. Namboodiri’s [1994] suggested ecological approach to
population dynamics would study fertility transitions in an even broader context.
A striking exception to ‘bigger theories’ is the paper by Friedman, Hechter, and
Kanmazawa [1994] setting forth an ‘uncertainty theory’ for the value of children. Although
they develop it strictly speaking as a theory of parenthood [that is, the first birth], they suggest it
might have wider applicability in the explanation of fertility transitions. Far from adding
content to existing theories, the authors take pride in their attempt to state a theory derived from
5

even fewer assumptions than standard microeconomic theory -- two rather than three. They
comment: ‘...a superior alternative will consist of an internally logically consistent theory which
has fewer behavioral assumptions [that is, only one assumption]...,’ but that is fruitful in terms
of implications, including hypotheses about previously unobserved relationships [p.387]. Given
the originality of this paper, it seems a shame that the main [only?] published comment is so
thoroughly negative [Lehrer, Grossbard-Shechtman, and Leasure, 1996] -- a dismissal of
‘uncertainty theory’ as heretical and a reaffirmation of orthodox microeconomic theories. A
more open examination of the theory seems likely to lead to new insights, whatever its flaws.7
Pollak and Watkins [1993] toy with a theoretical direction whose effects on complexity
would be ambiguous -- it would lead to theory with fewer distinct concepts, but with some of
the concepts, notably culture, much broader and more complex in themselves. As a way of
reconciling the conflict between economic and cultural explanations of fertility decline, they
consider abandoning ‘the analytical distinction between opportunities and preferences’ [p.490],
in a major departure from conventional microeconomics, which considers preferences and
constraints as conceptually distinct and independent [indeed, it often is said that one can speak
of differences in tastes or preferences as leading to differences in behaviour only in cases where
prices and income constraints are identical]. They write: ‘...accounts that emphasize the unity
of culture, viewing culture as a choherent whole, a bundle of practices and values...deny the
validity of dichotomous opportunities-preferences classification of the rational actor model....
[T]his cultural perspective emphasizes that, in some cases at least, the bond between
opportunities and preferences is strong’ [p.490]. Strictly speaking, this approach reduces the
number of variables, but only by greatly expanding the empirical referent of the concept culture
to include almost everything in society. Culture is viewed as a ‘coherent whole’; opportunities
[and constraints] and preferences are ‘the warp and woof of the fabric of culture’ [p.485]. Their
justification for this approach is that ‘the bond between opportunities and preferences is strong’
[p.490].
Their idea may be seen as a small instance of a seeming loss of faith in abstract analytic
science, to be discussed later in more detail. But they face an uphill struggle to justify giving up
conceptual distinctions which are so firmly rooted in behavioural theory [in economics,
psychology, sociology, and anthropology] and in common sense, simply because of theoretical
or empirical ‘bonds’ between the concepts. The fact that two things co-vary does not imply that
they are not different things. In the case at hand, clearly some opportunities [or constraints] are
cultural [social norms derived from culturally given values, definitions or perceptions of

7

. Notably, the authors accord little recognition to other strategies for coping with
uncertainty, some of which have been institutionalized: religion; magic; astrology; suicide;
gambling; drugs and alcohol; hobbies; political action; fanaticism [as in being an avid fan]; etc.
It also is not clear that all of their implications and hypotheses can be derived solely from the two
axioms in the absence of many auxiliary assumptions. The ‘uncertainty theory’ has potential
links with a large social-psychological literature on social roles and identity, but the authors fail
to develop these links.
6

opportunities -- e.g., the common cultural myth of equal opportunity for all]. But some are
more fundamental, more objective -- culture cannot define away a shortage of arable land, or a
lack of modern contraceptives. It also is the case that opportunities may help to shape
preferences over time, and that collective and individual preferences may shape opportunities
and constraints -- the social construction of reality. As I have suggested elsewhere [Burch,
1996, p.69], this is a strong argument for more complex dynamic causal models, but not for a
retreat from analysis.
Independently of Pollak and Watkins and in very different contexts, Bongaarts [1992]
and Lee, Galloway, and Hammel [1994] develop models that involve a blending of formerly
distinct concepts very much along the lines sketched by Pollak and Watkins. Both papers are
primarily empirical, but both also claim to be empirical implementations of the Easterlin supplydemand theoretical synthesis.
Bongaarts effects a decomposition of fertility by expressing actual fertility as a weighted
average of wanted fertility and natural fertility:
F = Fw * Ip + Fn * [1 - Ip]

[Eq.1]

where F is actual fertility, Fw the number of births couples want, Fn the number they would
have in the absence of deliberate control, and Ip an appropriate weight. Bongaarts terms Ip the
‘index of preference implementation,’ and estimates it by solving Eq.1 for Ip:
Ip = [Fn - F] / [Fn - Fw]

[Eq.2]

Fn is estimated by formula from actual fertility and the proportion of married women using
contraception.
The most direct interpretation of Ip is that it is the proportion of unwanted births that are
averted. The numerator [Fn - F] gives the number of births averted; the denominator [Fn - Fw]
gives total unwanted births. Ip can be related to the Easterlin formulation by noting that the
denominator [Fn - Fw] is similar to Easterlin’s concept of motivation, defined as the difference
between surviving children in the absence of control and surviving children wanted if control
were viewed as cost-free. In Easterlin, birth averted, corresponding to Bongaarts’ [Fn - F], is
proportional to the difference between motivation and costs [economic and psychic], or,
assimilating Easterlin’s idea to Bongaarts’ notation:
Fn - F ~ {[Fn - Fw] - costs} = [motivation - costs]
Substituting into the equation for Ip yields:
Ip ~ {[Fn - Fw] - costs} / [Fn - Fw]
~ 1- costs / motivation.
7

In other words, Ip reflects both motivation to reduce fertility and the costs of the means of
doing so. The index of preference implementation tends to be lowered by high costs of control,
and raised by high motivation. But the two behavioural mechanisms are captured in one index.
Bongaarts says as much: ‘Ip...rises as fertility regulation costs decline and its benefits [i.e., the
elimination of unwanted births] rise’ [p.343]; Ip is a measure of ‘the role of the costs and
benefits of fertility regulation’ [Abstract, p.382, emphasis added].
Whatever else may be said for it, this decomposition exercise does not correspond to the
Easterlin model, which consistently distinguishes motivation and costs, and tries to measures
them separately. What is gained in elegance and empirical tractability may be lost, however, in
difficulties of interpretation arising when end and means are merged into one. Applying the
system to simple scenarios yields strange results:
Case A: Fn = 7; Fw = 6; F = 6 -----------> Ip = 1.00
Case B: Fn = 7; Fw = 6; F = 7 -----------> Ip = 0.00
In other words, Ip takes on its extreme values for cases that do not differ much behaviourally, a
difference of one child at high levels of fertility.
Or consider:
Case C: Fn = 7; Fw = 3; F = 5 -----------> Ip = 0.50
Couples in case C have averted twice as many births as those in case A, but their index of
preference implementation is only half as large. Finally
Case D: Fn = 7; Fw = 1; F = 3 -----------> Ip = 0.67
In other words, couples in case D have a relatively high index of preference implementation
despite the fact that they have three times as many births as they want.
The real-world data used by Bongaarts also poses some interpretive challenges. For
example, across the 18 nations studied, Ip ranges from 0.19 to 0.94, suggesting a wide range in
the ability of couples to implement their reproductive preferences. Yet the correlation
coefficient between actual fertility and wanted fertility is high -- 0.95, r2 = 0.90 -- suggesting
relative uniformity in the degree of preference implementation [or, alternatively that much of the
causation runs from actual to desired fertility rather than vice-versa, a possibility worth further
exploration].
A paper by Lee, Galloway, and Hammel [1994] involves a measure that is conceptually
identical to that of Bongaarts, but uses different terminology and symbols. They define D [cf.
Bongaarts’ Ip] as ‘the proportion of excess births which is avoided [p.354],’ noting that it is a
measure of ‘...the combined effects of the proportions seeking to avert births and the efficiency
8

with which they achieve their goal through contraception, abortion, and abstinence’ [p.354,
emphasis added]. The confounding of means and end is mitigated in their analysis by the
inclusion of D in a multivariate equation which controls for fertility control cost-related
variables such as religion.
The issue is not that Ip and D are in themselves invalid -- clearly they measure what they
measure, namely a demographic outcome, unwanted births averted. But explanatory theory and
policy analysis are crucially concerned also with process. And in the case at hand the
behavioural processes of goal-setting and effective use of relevant means are confounded. My
diet can be completely ‘successful’ if I only try to lose one kilo and do so; or it can be only a
little bit ‘successful’ [largely a failure] if I adhere to a sound regimen of lowered caloric intake
and exercise, and lose 5 kilos when my goal was to lose twenty. Common sense says that the
second scenario involves greater success objectively. Subjectively, one can argue that success
should be judged only in terms of an individual’s personal goals [’consumer sovereignty’?], but
not many [individuals or societies] would be willing to apply this principle across the board,
including, I suspect, the above authors.
Lee [personal communication] points out that for their historical study of Prussia there
are no direct measures -- or even good proxies -- for costs of fertility control. He questions
whether there are really good measures of costs even for contemporary situations. To the extent
this is so, then of course a cost measure cannot be broken out in a multivariate statistical model.
But this is not a persuasive reason to drop the needed distinctions in theoretical statements and
in theory-based models.
2. Virtually all authors have argued for greater attention to cultural and ideational
factors in fertility decline, and most for the harmonization of economic and cultural
explanations. This is one of the specific reasons behind the substantive enlargement of theories
noted above. Again, the 1987 paper by Cleland and Wilson has been pivotal in this
development, although most authors have not shared their tendency to favour culture ‘rather
than’ economics. The more common approach has been to try to synthesize the two sets of
factors: Lesthaeghe and Surkyn [1988; see also earlier works by Lesthaeghe]; Hammel [1990;
1993]; Mason [1992]; Pollak and Watkins [1993]; Greenhalgh [1995]. Montgomery and
Casterline [1996] retain rational decision making as a key element in their tripartite model,
along with social learning and influence. Bongaarts and Watkins [1996] aim to bring ‘social
interaction’ to center stage, but their empirical evidence requires retention of ‘development’ [in
the form of the U.N. human development index] as an important variable in fertility decline.8

8

. Their rhetoric sometimes suggests differently: ‘...if fertility and development were
closely linked...’ [p.641, emphasis added]. But they are talking here about relationships with the
timing and pace of fertility decline. In their Figure 2, virtually no nation with a human
development index of greater than 0.8 has a total fertility rate above 3; virtually no nation with a
human development index of less than 0.5 has a total fertility rate less than about 5.
9

There has been some expansion of the concept of culture as it applies to this context,
with emphasis on the variety of cultural elements that may be involved: social norms regarding
family size or fertility control methods; ideals on family size; social definitions of age and
gender roles; secularization; individualism; ‘family nucleation’; Westernization; etc. Some
[e.g., Lesthaeghe] have emphasized the internal dynamics of cultural systems, such as the
unfolding of ideas of The Enlightenment within the European sphere. Others [e.g., Caldwell, in
his earlier work on contemporary developing countries] have emphasized external diffusion of
ideas from outside cultures [Westernization]. Van Da Kaa [1996] emphasises the differences in
this regard between the historical West and contemporary developing nations.
If most authors have thought culture and ideation important to fertility decline, there
have been few concrete suggestions as to how these factors are to be conceptualized and
measured, and how specifically cultural hypotheses are to be tested -- really tested instead of
relying on the facile assumption that residual variance or differences must be due to ‘culture.’
Lesthaeghe’s early work using voting statistics to proxy secular individualism, and van de
Walle’s detailed historical study of the rise of quantitative notions about family size [1992] are
notable exceptions. Hammel [1990] and Greenhalgh [1995] have tried to introduce systematic
ideas about culture from anthropology, with only partial success. The average demographer
does not quite know how to systematically incorporate culture into his or her thinking about
fertility. Culture is too specific, too concrete, too particularistic, too resistant to generalization.
We have the same problem as Notestein [1945], who saw that ideas associated with The
Revolution had helped bring about early French fertility decline, but relegated the insight to a
footnote, rather than making it central to his emerging transition theory.
3. The Concept of Diffusion Has Taken Center Stage. The notion of diffusion has a
long history in fertility decline theory. Carlsson [1966] was perhaps one of the first to give it
prominence, posing the question whether fertility decline in Sweden was due to ’adjustment’
[application of old ideas to new circumstances] or to ‘innovation’ [application of new ideas,
partly diffused from elsewhere]. The work of Rogers [Rogers and Kincaid, 1981] touched the
field briefly in the 1970's but did not have a large permanent impact.9 Massive empirical data
from the European Fertility Project showing similar fertility trends across national borders, but
differing fertility trends within nations but across linguistic-cultural borders, were interpreted as
evidence of diffusion and of the important role of culture in explaining fertility decline.
To attribute fertility decline to diffusion, however, is not necessarily to explain it. It can
be just a restatement of the explicandum, the spread of fertility decline or of the practice of
family planning. There is danger of tautology. For the concept of diffusion to have explanatory
value, it is necessary to look at what is being diffused [Mason, 1992] and at the mechanisms by
9

. It is interesting to note that the late 1960's appointment of Bernard Berelson, a nondemographer, as president of The Population Council was based in no small measure on his
background in ‘mass communications,’ presumed to be a key factor in promoting successful
family planning programs.
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which some idea or behaviour is transmitted from one place to another. As de Carvalho has
recently commented: ‘These illusive [sic] determinants [of overall fertility decline] have often
been conceptualized in terms of the diffusion of anti-natalist norms, values, and behaviour. Yet
the mechanisms at the heart of the diffusion model are poorly understood and inadequately
specified. These limitations seriously undermine the predictive power of the diffusion model,
and its practical applicability to real contexts...’ [1997, pp.2-3].
An important attempt to render the diffusion concept more specific is by Rosero-Bixby
and Casterline [1993]. Drawing on a large general literature on the conceptualization and
modelling of diffusion, they develop a dynamical model, a system of differential equations,
tracking the movement of married women of reproductive age among different fertility-control
sub-groups, in effect from uninterested, to interested but unable, to actually controlling. This
movement is enhanced by presumed social interaction among the various groups leading to
‘contagion,’ a function among other things of sub-group sizes. They also develop a model that
allows diffusion from one population sector to another [e.g., rural and urban, upper and lower
class], along with interaction diffusion within sectors.
Bongaarts and Watkins [1996] develop an even broader concept of diffusion, which they
rename ‘social interaction.’ They discuss three different types of diffusion -- or in their terms,
‘three different levels’ at which social interaction operates: ‘personal networks connect
individuals; national channels of social interactions such as migration and language connect social
and territorial communities within a country; and global channels such as trade and international
organizations connect nations within the global society’ [Abstract, p.811]. Their first two levels
seem closely related to Rosero-Bixby and Casterline’s ‘interaction diffusion.’ Their last level
introduces a new dimension, variously referred to as ‘external’ or ‘point-source’ or ‘external
influence’ diffusion [Mahajan and Peterson, 1985; Heckfeldt, Kohfeld, and Likens, 1982, p.30].
Montgomery and Casterline [1996] take a slightly different approach to elaboration of the
concept of diffusion: ‘The concept of diffusion can be separated into two fundamental
components, social learning and social influence’ [p.151]. Roughly speaking, the former refers to
transmission of ideas, the latter to social constraints on behaviour, modelled in terms reminiscent
of Kurt Lewin’s field theory or the more recent conceptualizations by Fishbein [1963;1972; see
also, Falbo and H. Becker, 1980].10 Montgomery and Casterline view social learning and social
influence as two parts of ‘a common conceptual model,’ the third part being ‘rational individual
decision-making’ [p.152]. Their model thus integrates social structure, culture and economy.
Kohler [1997a; 1997b; 1998] has explored a number of specific phenomena within the
general area of ‘social interaction’/fertility interrelationships. His work combines sophisticated
10

. In contrast to ‘uncertainty theory,’ Montgomery and Casterline’s paper makes good
use of the enormous general literature relevant to their concerns in sociology, psychology, and
social psychology. This is a marked departure from the practice of much earlier work in
demography, not infrequently involved in re-inventing conceptual/theoretical wheels.
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economic theory and modelling, a broad grounding in relevant literature of other disciplines [for
example, the sociological works of Giddens], and serious attention to the revisionist economic
ideas of Brian Arthur and others, with emphasis on stochastic and non-linear elements. Given past
experience with the work of Becker and the Chicago School on the microeconomics of fertility, it
may take a while before non-economist demographers digest more than the general drift of
Kohler’s work. His active collaboration with social demographers such as Watkins, however, and
their involvement in interdisciplinary empirical research projects should help in this respect.
Taken together, these works on diffusion seem to me to constitute a large step forward
toward a general theory of fertility, one in which social structure finally plays an important role.11
If one could combine their ideas effectively with the Easterlin supply-demand model and with the
rich, historically-based, and flexible synthesis of Lesthaeghe, the progress would be great indeed.
4. Attempts to bring biology, specifically evolutionary theory, to bear on fertility
decline. Two recent papers pursue this theme. Potts [1997] concludes: ‘The argument that
development causes fertility decline is flawed because people cannot make choices about family
size without realistic access to fertility-regulation technology, and such access is historically
recent and remains geographically limited’ [Abstract, p.221]. Given the riches of evolutionary
theory, this is an anticlimactic conclusion, reverting to earlier ‘instrumental’ theories of fertility
decline that confuse means and motivation and necessary and sufficient conditions. On the other
hand, hardly anyone would deny that availability of effective fertility control is an important
element in fertility decline processes. Arguments such as that by Robinson and Cleland [1992]
that availability of means can affect other factors such as preferences or demand for children tend
to heighten that importance.
Kaplan [1994] purports to test Caldwell’s ‘wealth flows’ theory of fertility decline with
data from a preliterate nomadic society. As I have noted elsewhere, the test is compromised
insofar as a society with a minimum of age-sex stratification is not the ideal test of a theory whose
central mechanism rests on patriarchy [Burch, 1996, fn.8]. But there probably is something to the
argument that a wealth flow to the older generation of such kind and amount as to lead to
exploitation of the young poses survival risks for a population or society -- a fact that developed
societies with youth unemployment rates of twenty percent and upwards and total fertility rates of
1.2 or 1.3 might want to think about, for political if not scientific reasons.
My knowledge of biology is not vast. But my guess is that evolutionary theory is not
where the cross-disciplinary payoff lies for fertility theory. My approach would be to take a
closer look at population biology and ecosystems science [Levin et al., 1997; see also
Namboodiri, 1994], where individual-population interrelationships are similar and where great
11

. This theoretical work on diffusion, originally stimulated by empirical research
[notably the European Fertility History Project], has in turn led to several on-going empirical
studies. See, for example, Watkins, Rutenberg, and Green [1995], Stoner-Eby [1998] and
Montgomery and Zhao [1998].
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strides have been made in modelling of these interrelationships.
To summarize this section on substance, development of the above themes may be viewed
as ‘normal science’ rather than as paradigm shifts, with very little that can’t be found in Notestein,
Davis, or Coale, if one reads the fine print. The focus on ‘social interaction,’ ‘diffusion,’ and
‘social influence’ might be considered such a shift, but most of the key actors build on rather than
reject an underlying microeconomic choice model. It seems to me more like a fleshing out of the
microeconomic skeleton, along lines adumbrated by Easterlin from the very beginning [1969].
Uncertainty theory also may be counted an exception [although it too works off the basic
economic choice model], along with the attempt to cast fertility decline in evolutionary terms. But
neither of these has yet yielded large theoretical payoffs or stimulated much empirical research by
demographers.
Methodological Tendencies
1. There is continuing ambivalence about aiming for theory at high levels of
generalization and abstraction, and uncertainty about the possibility of one unified theory.
In terms of recent writings, Szreter [1994] stands towards one pole, emphasising the concreteness
of fertility decline processes in a way that would divert attention and effort away from general
unified theory [even if does not deny its possibility], and calling for ‘...emancipation from the
dominance of the abstract idea of “demographic” or “fertility” transition and the associated, too
exclusive deference to the covering laws methodology...’ [p.692]. Szreter calls for:
...an accumulation of patient, carefully contextualized, investigative projects on fertility
change in specific communities, where the form that fertility change takes is not judged in
advance.... Only such studies as these can do justice to the variety of changing fertility
behaviours in any community and can examine the ways in which economic and political
forces of change are mediated by local, cultural, and institutional forms such as changes in
language, values, and roles.... [p.692].12
At the other pole stand Friedman, Hechter, and Kanmazawa [1994] who favour very
simple and abstract theory. In their view, a theory is to be judged good [that is, ‘fruitful]
‘...insofar as it minimizes the number of assumptions from which hypotheses are derived,
maximizes the number and variety of hypotheses derived from these assumptions, and generates
hypotheses about phenomena and relationships that have not yet been observed’ [p.387].
Simplicity, abstractness, and generality are to be achieved by picking a small number of
assumptions that may themselves be oversimplified or even unrealistic. They quote approvingly
several authors who hold that a theory should be judged more by its hypotheses than by its
12

. In a recent conversation, Szreter suggests that I had earlier read too much into these
statements, and that he does not rule out the possibility of some kind of general theory. In his
most recent work [1996] he focuses on changing perceptions of the costs of children as a key
general element in fertility decline.
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assumptions: Jasso [1988], Stinchcombe [1991], and especially Friedman [1953]: ‘...the more
significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions...’, that is, assumptions that are ‘wildly
inaccurate representations of reality...’ [p.14].
The bulk of theoretical writing on fertility has taken a middle course: general theory is
needed and possible, but it should be true to the realities of historical experience and to our
intuitive sense of how human beings behave. This methodological predilection for ‘realistic’
theory may be one of the reasons mainstream social demography has tended to hold Beckerian
microeconomic theory at arm’s length, using it only ‘heuristically,’ not for purpose of rigorous
statement and inference [McNicoll, 1992].13 This strain toward realism lies beneath the general
tendency to enlarge content of theories and make them more complex, as described earlier. It is
being reinforced by the current interest in ‘qualitative methods,’ and a concomitant weakening of
exclusive reliance on standard analytic methodologies [the general linear model] for the analysis
of typical data [large-sample surveys].
The same tendency has lead many to hedge their bets as to whether there can be one theory
of fertility decline. Caldwell’s classic work [1976] started with the view that one theory was
needed to explain the start of fertility decline, another theory to explain its continuation. The
theme is echoed in the masterful review of migration theory by Massey et al. [1993], and by
Feeney [1994] in his summary of East Asian fertility trends. Mason [1997], by contrast, looks for
a general theory that will explain not only fertility transitions, but other changes and differences as
well.
Closely related is the suggestion that the phrase fertility decline is ambiguous, and that
different theories may be needed to account for different specific meanings of that phrase: marital
or overall fertility; the fact of fertility decline, as opposed to its timing or speed; fertility decline
over different time scales or at different geographical levels; etc. [Burch, 1996; Mason, 1992;
1997]. Bongaarts and Watkins in fact speak of three different dependent variables [1996, pp.641642].
Hirschman [1994] notes that ‘The vast body of empirical evidence on the origins, speed,
and correlates of fertility declines in different historical and geographical settings shows more
diversity than a single theory of fertility change would predict,’ and poses the challenge ‘...to
develop a common theoretical framework that will accommodate the diversity of historical paths
from high to low fertility’ [p.203]. Caldwell [1997] has recently posed a similar challenge in his
Beijing IUSSP address ‘The Global Fertility Transition, the Need for a Unifying Theory.’
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. Another part of the explanation is that most non-economist demographers simply do
not know enough economic theory or mathematical economics to master the details of the
relevant literature. In other words, our stance towards Becker has been due partly to tastes and
partly to constraints. The latter provide a strong argument for more cross-disciplinary
collaboration.
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2. There is continuing absence of rigorous, ‘formal’ statements of theory. This
tendency is closely related to the one described above as point #1. The simpler, more abstract a
theoretical structure, the easier it is to state and manipulate it in terms of analytic mathematics or
formal logic. The more realistic a theory -- the more it tries to be faithful to complex, concrete
reality -- the more intractable it becomes using these tools. This is why abstract theorists and
mathematical modellers typically urge that we start with ‘the simplest case’ that is relevant to the
problem at hand, and why they use the word tractable so often.

But as theories become richer in content and more complex, the dangers of more informal
modes of theoretical discourse come into play, chief among them vagueness and logical errors.
Mathematics and newer computer languages yield not just numerical precision but also – and
perhaps more important – logical rigour.
Lack of formalization has not been as nearly complete as it was in earlier decades, when
many influential theoretical pieces took the form of ceremonial addresses to the Population
Association of America. The models by Rosero-Bixby and Casterline [1993] and most recently by
Lesthaeghe [1997] have introduced considerable formalization into the specification of processes
moving people among states defined with reference to their orientation to fertility control,
processes that lie at the heart of aggregate fertility decline. Rosero-Bixby and Casterline use
differential equations, Lesthaeghe uses a mathematical statistical approach, but the underlying
conceptualization is similar. Economists have always been more inclined and more able to state
their theories in mathematical form, a tendency, as noted earlier, that has limited the influence of
the details of their theoretical systems on demographers with other disciplinary backgrounds.
Eloundou-Enyegue and Stokes [elsewhere in this volume]] continue in this tradition,
proposing a matrix framework involving nine parameters and a child quality production function.
The framework is put forward not as ‘substitute to current theories,’ but as ‘a device to quantify
and integrate their influences.’
Montgomery and Casterline [1996] offer several equations which express their central
concepts of social learning and social influence, integrated with ordinary microeconomic notions
such as the utility function, but stop short of the systems of equations to which these formulations
seem to be pointing. Nor have they yet specified which elements in potentially indefinitely large
vectors of influences are the crucial ones, theoretically speaking. As noted earlier, Kohler has
explored notions of social interaction and social influence using a high degree of economic
theoretical formalism.
Burch [1997] has begun an attempt to synthesise several leading theories and to express
them in terms of systems dynamics language for computer simulation.
Montgomery and Zhao [1998] have developed a dynamic individual decision model which
is then embedded in a model of social network structure. Simulated results of the model are
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compared with field data from Ghana, with promising results.
The demographic tradition of explanation through decomposition or the partitioning of
variance continues in papers by Bongaarts [1992; 1997] and by Lee, Galloway, and Hammel
[1994], discussed in detail earlier. While useful for summary descriptions of what has happened - decomposing the explicandum -- these formulations seem to me to fall short of explanatory
models dealing with process and mechanisms of change, even when the decomposition is
embedded in a multivariate model. The analysis is more formal than behavioural.
Overall, formalization of fertility theories has been limited, dealing with only bits and
pieces of our most comprehensive theories. We are a long way from a complete, rigorous, and
formal statement of theoretical systems as rich as those of Montgomery and Casterline [1996],
Bongaarts and Watkins [1996], or, especially, Lesthaeghe.
3. Some confusion remains about the relationship between abstract theory and
explanations of concrete historical events. Max Weber [1949 ed.] made a sharp distinction
between ‘social science’ and ‘sociology.’ The one sought abstract social laws, general regularities
in behaviour or structure. The other sought to use those laws, among other things, to explain
concrete historical processes. The distinction has been repeated over the years. Homans [1967],
for example, discusses it under the heading ‘psychological explanations’ in history, showing how
explanations of concrete events involve a mixture of general behavioural premises and specific
historical facts [p.44]. Anderson has summed it up nicely [1986]: ‘What is needed to understand
marital fertility decline is not a unique theory or explanation...for each different time and place,
but particular knowledge of the culture and history and detailed data for small areas, combined
with the discipline inherent in a theoretical approach’ [p.313].
The development of abstract theory, including microeconomics, uncertainty theory,
exchange theory, diffusion theory, etc., is simply a different intellectual game than the
development of an adequate explanation of fertility decline in, say, India in the period 1948 to
date, or in England since the 19th century. The two games are or should be related, but they are
different. To a certain extent they will move on separate tracks, with empirical research and more
realistic theorizing poses a constant challenge to the highly abstract, simplified representations of
a Becker, or of Friedman, Hechter, and Kanmazawa, and with abstract theory and associated
research giving detailed guidance as to the variables, functional forms, and parameters.
E.O. Wilson has recently written of biology:

Much of the history of biology can be expressed metaphorically as a dynamic tension
between unit and aggregate, between reduction and holism. An equilibrium in this tension
is neither possible nor desirable. As large patterns emerge, ambitious hard-science
reductionists set out to dissolve them with nonconforming new data. Conversely,
whenever empirical researchers discover enough new nonconforming phenomena to create
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chaos, synthesizers move in to restore order. In tandem the two kinds of endeavors nudge
the discipline forward [quoted in Science 265 [23 September 1994] p.1901].
This could be a description of the development of demographic fertility theory, especially over the
last two decades.
But there is a growing body of opinion to the effect that the days of the dominance of
extremely abstract analytic theory may be numbered -- or at least that its status as the norm and
goal of all scientific theory will diminish -- due to the advent of the computer with its ability to
handle more complicated theoretical systems and models. Others argue that what has worked for
physics or for economics [maybe] may be less appropriate for biology or for behavioural and
social sciences, in which history and extreme complexity are characteristic. No doubt computer
simulation or modelling is destined to play a much larger role in theoretical work in the coming
century.
The practice of working with smaller models, models which the human mind can
comprehend, seems unlikely to disappear entirely, however, if only for aesthetic and psychological
reasons. It remains one path to insight into how things work. Besides, we can never rule out in
advance the possibility that someday someone will come up with an elegant theory that explains
the phenomena of interest. Empirical verification of highly abstract, simplified models will
always be hampered, however, by our virtual inability to perform strictly controlled experiments.
Some Concluding Comments
Demography as a discipline has tended not to be self-conscious about methodology [as
opposed to technique] -- the epistemology and logic of scientific procedure and explanation.
Lesthaeghe’s recent [1998] exploration of demographic applications of the work of Lakatos is a
notable exception. As a multi-disciplinary field, demography lacks consensus on methodology,
with practitioners bringing different methodological ideas from different disciplines. Even the
best possible theory of fertility decline imaginable might fail to command acceptance in all
quarters. It is difficult to think of a theoretical statement that would satisfy Szreter [history] or
Greenhalgh [anthropology] and at the same time followers of Becker, or Friedman, Hechter, and
Kanmazawa. Over the long term too much self-consciousness about scientific procedure,
including theory building, is not healthy, but at the moment demography might benefit from a
period of self-examination on these matters. This is especially so as ‘computer modelling’ [or
‘scientific computing’] is establishing itself as a new way of ‘doing science,’ with its relationships
to traditional experiment, non-experimental statistical analyses, and theory still to be worked out.
As a practicing demographer, I am not sure where to look for guidance on an approach to
theory, explanation, and computer modelling that might command widespread acceptance among
demographers. Perhaps methodologists and philosophers of science, or practitioner in other
fields, have set forth the directions to follow, but I cannot claim a systematic knowledge of the
relevant literature.
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I have recently encountered, however, a slim and somewhat old book on explanation
[Meehan, 1968. See also 1994] that seems to me to have anticipated our current situation and to
point the way forward. Meehan rejects the ‘covering law’ approach to explanation, arguing for a
‘systems’ approach in its stead. The system is a rigorously stated formal structure which in strict
logic entails the phenomenon to be explained. A good system can predict and suggest ways in
which at least in theory outcomes might be controlled. Verification or validation of an
explanation of a particular phenomenon or class involves showing that the system is more or less
‘isomorphic’ with respect to the real world system to be explained. The focus is on explaining
specific events, and on prediction and control, rather than just ‘understanding,’ as sensible aims of
explanation.
Meehan wrote when computers and computer modelling were in their infancy, and speaks
several times of the difficulties of manipulating systems, of being able to work out a ‘formal
calculus’ for logical inference when systems become complex. Modern programming tools would
seem to provide the solution.
In its emphasis on an explanatory system [theory?] as a purely formal structure, Meehan’s
ideas somewhat resemble standard economic theory, but his systems are not derived from a
limited number of axioms -- propositions in the system can be derived from axioms, but also from
intuitions, empirical regularities, etc., that is, from any source that might give insight into how the
system works. Meehan also insists that just predicting an outcome is not enough; the system
must allow us to see into the black box of process and mechanisms -- there must be an overall
isomorphism, not just agreement in terms of outcomes.
Pending more research into these ideas and their background in methodological writings, I
sense, as noted above, that they are pointing us in the right direction as to the form of the unified
theory we seek.
In any event, I believe we are close to achieving a comprehensive integrated theory of
fertility decline. We probably have all the pieces for the puzzle [I say ‘probably’ because
‘uncertainty theory’ must give one pause: no doubt there are still other new ideas waiting in the
wings]. Indeed, we may have too many pieces for one puzzle. There are at least three reasons for
this.
First, some of the elaborations and detailed distinctions made in recent writing may turn
out to be unnecessary, adding nothing to explanatory or predictive power. Montgomery and
Casterline’s return to a ‘value times expectancy’ concept of the actor’s orientation to behaviour
may be a case in point. Falbo and H. Becker [1980], for example, in a test of Fishbein’s similar
conceptualisation, suggested that the ‘value times expectancy’ elaboration of attitudes was
redundant. Respondents tended to think about and mention rewards or punishments only if they
thought them highly likely; unlikely outcomes or utilities tended not to be salient.
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Second, we may have some duplicate pieces, different names for virtually the same
concepts. As noted above, Lesthaeghe’s and Montgomery and Casterline’s three categories of
people with respect to their orientation to fertility control are similar, except for terminology and
for the fact that Lesthaeghe allows more flexibility in the temporal order in which people move
through the categories.14 They are close enough that some consolidation is possible.
Third, there may be pieces to more than one puzzle. That is, some theoretical propositions
found in the literature may be essentially contradictory. For example, a theory that assumes
unvarying tastes [preferences] is incompatible with a theory that attributes a large part of fertility
decline to declining preferences [as distinct from demand] for children.
In any case, I believe we should try to assemble the puzzle from the pieces at hand, to try
to create a synthetic theory based self-consciously on the existing body of literature. Apart from
the relatively few contradictory elements just noted, it will be one theory, but also one admitting
different levels of generality. This process of refinement and synthesis will require a degree of
clarity and precision in the definition of concepts and in the statement of theoretical propositions
that goes beyond what has been commonplace in theoretical writing, with the notable exception of
economics. There will be explicit attention to things like ‘scope conditions,’ that serve to
distinguish different theoretical levels, or, if you will, sub-theories. How the process of fertility
decline works, for example, clearly depends in some way on whether it takes place in the presence
or absence of modern contraception and modern state-financed family planning programs. A
general theory of fertility will have to incorporate these and similar facts.15
My personal view [see Burch, 1996] is that the complexity at hand and the needed rigour
in theoretical statement and manipulation will push us beyond ordinary language, traditional logic,
and even analytic mathematics, to a greater reliance on computer modelling, using ‘languages’
such as ‘systems dynamics’ or C/C++ [object-oriented modelling]. This rigour will be sought not
for its own sake, but because it will be needed if we are to derive valid implications from our
theory, and if the theory is to be tested.
The assembled puzzle may be pretty and persuasive to some, especially those who have
built it, but in empirical science we still have to ask if it is true in the limited and qualified sense
that the term is used in science. Testing a theory can occur only if we can state implications
derived from the theory by strict logic. A ‘rubber-band’ theory, one that can be stretched to

14

. This is an important difference insofar as differences in temporal order may be a key
to differences in the rapidity of fertility decline.
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. Paradoxically, it would seem that a general theory of fertility will have to be either
very abstract, or very detailed – bordering on the concrete. This seems to take us back to Weber’s
classic distinction mentioned earlier, and to the idea that constructing a general theory and
applying it in order to explain a concrete historical event are two distinct tasks. In Meehan’s
terminology, a formal system must be ‘loaded’ in order to explain a specific event.
19

explain any outcome, can be neither disproven nor verified. But our synthetic theory will be too
complex to work out its implications in our head, to intuit them. The age of ‘eye-balling’
theoretical predictions is over.
Thus, new methodologies will be required Reliance on statistical estimation of parameters
in multivariate models may have to move over to allow room for new approaches to theory
validation, if only because the number of parameters will be so large, and the functional forms
highly non-linear. The work of Jacobsen and Bronson [1995] points in at least one promising
direction.
Preoccupation with these tasks of theoretical synthesis, methodological advance, and
empirical testing will carry demographic science into the twenty-first century at a new level of
scientific maturity and of policy relevance.
* * *
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